The MIXP has two route servers aka route reflectors. When a participant
peers with the route server, No traffic will be exchanged with the route
servers themselves, or their ASN. They just facilitate the exchange of
BGP updates.
We highly recommend that you set up session to either one to enable
prefixes and traffic exchange from any other participant who also has a
session to the route server, if your peering policy is open.
Please set up sessions to the following:
Route Server 1:
ASN: 37324
IPv4 Neighbour: 196.223.0.201
IPv6 Neighbour: 2001:43f8:270:d0d0::201
Route Server 2:
ASN: 37324
IPv4 Neighbour: 196.223.0.202
IPv6 Neighbour: 2001:43f8:270:d0d0::202
Route-collector/looking-glass service: Peering to this will never result
in any traffic exchange. This is meant purely for troubleshooting and
statistical purposes.
Peering sessions to the route collector server are publicly viewable
here: https://lg.mixp.org/
We strongly request you to set up a session for both IPv4 and IPv6, it
does not share any of your routes to anyone else nor provide you any
routing or traffic.
You are encouraged to keep the configuration and filters on this session
identical to your route-server and bilateral sessions, so that the
information in the looking glass is accurate.
Route Collector
ASN: 327821
IPv4: 196.223.0.199
IPv6: 2001:43f8:270:d0d0::199
For any additional support, please contact peering(a)mixp.org
MIXP technical volunteers
--
Keessun Fokeerah
MIXP team
--
Mauritius Internet Exchange Point(MIXP)
w: http://www.mixp.org/
Hi All,
The MIXP has taken a further step in helping to reduce the potential for
routing abuse, by digitally signing the network prefixes that it uses
for operating the IXP in Mauritius. This is part of its ongoing
programme to grow and foster best practices in IXP management, and
teaching networks best peering practices.
RPKI is a mechanism for cryptographically signalling which Internet
network (or, in technical terms, which origin autonomous system) is
allowed to publish a routing statement for a block of IP addresses.
This is one of the techniques that has become widespread to help combat
some of the attempts at hijacking network address space; a very real
problem that exists on the Internet, and one that is likely going to get
worse, as it becomes more and more difficult to get additional IPv4
address space.
Three weeks ago, the MIXP took the important step of dropping all
routing announcements, that are considered to be a violation of this
policy, that go through the MIXP routing infrastructure. We did this,
after research into the networks prefixes that are announced at the
MIXP, and after working with participating domestic operators to clean
up their networks.
Over the past week, the MIXP team signed the network prefixes (IP
addresses) that we use for the MIXP infrastructure. This means that any
well-run network, that participates in using RPKI, will automatically be
immune to routing hijacks for the MIXP address space, and is considered
global best practice. The MIXP team is hoping to encourage more network
operators in Mauritius to start using RPKI, and hopes to start running
training classes on this soon.
During this process, we uncovered a bug in the AFRINIC RPKI system, that
we are working with AFRINIC to resolve. This highlights, the need for
operators to “get their hands dirty” with newer technologies, so that
they earn confidence, and make sure that the supporting systems around
this, are built to scale, and support operator needs.
--
Keessun Fokeerah
MIXP team
--
Mauritius Internet Exchange Point(MIXP)
w: http://www.mixp.org/